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Institute Examination in Law
By Spencer Gordon
The following answers to the questions set by the board of examiners of the 
American Institute of Accountants at the examinations of November, 1933, 
have been prepared at the request of The Journal of Accountancy. These 
answers have not been reviewed by the board of examiners and are in no way 
official. They represent merely the personal opinions of the author.—Editor, 
The Journal of Accountancy.
Examination in Commercial Law
November 17, 1933, 9 A.M. to 12:30 P.M.
An answer which does not state reasons will be considered incomplete. When­
ever practicable give answer first and then state reasons.
Group I
Answer all questions in this group.
No. 1 (10 points):
Beach drew a bill of exchange on Washburn as drawee and gave it to the 
payee for adequate consideration. The payee personally presented it to 
Washburn who immediately became enraged and tore up the bill. Against 
whom has the payee any right of action on the bill?
Answer:
The negotiable instruments act provides that where a drawee to whom a bill 
is delivered for acceptance destroys it, he will be deemed to have ac­
cepted it. The tearing up of the bill would, therefore, constitute an acceptance 
by Washburn, and if Washburn did not thereafter pay the bill the payee would 
have a right of action against him as acceptor. The payee would also have a 
right of action against Beach as drawee, provided the payee gave the drawer due 
notice of dishonor or made due protest if a foreign bill.
No. 2 (10 points):
O’Rourke gave a mortgage on real estate to Kenyon. The mortgage note 
was not paid at maturity but interest was paid currently, and the mortgage 
continued in force as an open one without formal renewal. The property was 
conveyed several times until it reached Wulff. Wulff as owner made an agree­
ment with Kenyon as mortgagee, personally assuming the mortgage debt, ex­
tending the time for the payment of it and specifying that interest was to be 
paid on February 19th and on August 19th of each year. Wulff then con­
veyed the property to Coleman, who paid the interest for several years, each 
payment being made from one to five days before it was due. The mortgagee 
upon foreclosure sought to hold Wulff for a deficiency. Wulff defended on the 
ground that the payment and acceptance of interest prior to its due date 
amounted in each instance to an extension of the mortgage without his consent 
and thereby relieved him as surety. Is his defense legally sound?
Answer:
As the question is drawn a definite answer can not be given. Probably the 
purpose of the question will be served by a discussion of the points of law 
involved.
There are two questions involved. One is whether Wulff was in effect surety 
for Coleman so that an extension of the debt by arrangement between Coleman
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and Kenyon without Wulff’s consent would discharge Wulff. The other is 
whether the acceptance by Kenyon of interest from Coleman before the semi­
annual interest date extended the payment of principal until that date. If 
Wulff was in effect surety for Coleman and if the acts of Coleman and Kenyon 
amounted to an extension without Wulff’s consent the defense would be sound.
Although there is a conflict among the authorities, probably Wulff was in 
effect a surety for Coleman to the extent of the value of the land at the date to 
which Wulff extended the mortgage. The reasoning leading to this conclu­
sion is as follows. When Wulff conveyed to Coleman apparently (although 
it is not clear from the question) Coleman did not assume the mortgage. In 
such a case, as between Wulff and Coleman, Wulff had the right to require that 
the land be first exhausted in the payment of the debt. Wulff could protect this 
right by paying the debt and becoming subrogated, to the extent mentioned, to 
the right of Kenyon to proceed against the property for payment. The exten­
sion agreement had the effect of interfering with Wulff’s right to protect himself 
in this manner beyond the original due date of the mortgage. This placed upon 
Wulff a new risk to which he had not consented. The value of the land might 
prove to be very much less at the end of the extended period than at the original 
maturity of the debt. However, the grantee stood in the quasi relationship of 
principal debtor only in respect to the land as the primary fund and to the 
extent of the value of the land. If that value was less than the mortgage debt, 
as to the balance he owed no duty or obligation whatever, and, as to that, Wulff 
stood to the end as he was at the beginning, the sole principal debtor. From 
any such balance he was not discharged but to the extent of the value of the land 
at the date to which Wulff extended the mortgage he was discharged. As the 
relative value of the land to the mortgage debt is not given in the question no 
definite answer can be given.
There are decisions and there is even language of the supreme court of the 
United States which indicate that where the grantee has not assumed the mort­
gage there is no relationship of principal and surety between grantee and grantor 
even to the extent indicated above. Such decisions, however, appear to be 
distinctly in the minority.
Had Coleman assumed the mortgage the case would be a stronger one for the 
establishment of the relationship of principal and surety.
It also can not be determined definitely from the question whether the acts of 
Coleman and Kenyon amounted to an extension. As the question is drawn 
there is nothing to indicate that the principal was overdue when the interest 
payments were accepted so that there is no indication that there was anything 
to extend.
There are decisions indicating that where principal is overdue and interest 
is paid shortly prior to the semi-annual interest date the acceptance of such 
interest by the mortgagee amounts to an extension to such interest date of the 
obligation to pay the principal. Probably such acceptance would have 
amounted to an extension to the semi-annual interest date if the principal were 
overdue when the interest payments were accepted.
No. 3 (10 points):
Miller, a diamond cutter, gave a diamond on memorandum to Falk, the 
written memorandum expressly providing that title was to remain in Miller 
until Miller approved of a sale by Falk. Falk, representing that he was the
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owner and without showing the written memorandum, sold the diamond to 
Porter for cash and then disappeared without accounting to Miller. Miller 
now sues Porter to recover possession of the diamond. For whom should 
judgment be rendered?
Answer:
In the absence of a local statute changing the common law Miller should 
recover judgment for possession of the diamond. Miller is the owner of the 
diamond. Falk had no right to make the sale since it had not been approved 
by Miller. Porter did not obtain any title or right of possession by such a 
sale.
No. 4 (10 points):
(a) How, in general, would you draw the line distinguishing interstate 
business from intrastate business?
(b) Are citizens of each state entitled to the privileges and immunities of 
citizens in the several states? (State the authority for your answer.)
(c) Is a corporation a citizen to which your answer to (b) applies?
Answer:
(a) In general, interstate business is business which involves commercial 
intercourse between states and all the component parts of such transactions; 
intrastate business is business which is initiated, transacted and concluded 
exclusively within a state.
(b) Article 4, section 2, clause 1, of the constitution of the United States 
reads: “The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and im­
munities of citizens in the several states.”
(c) A corporation is not a citizen within the meaning of this section.
No. 5 (10 points):
A retail storekeeper contracted with a newspaper to publish an advertise­
ment in which certain articles were listed at the price of $15 each. The news­
paper negligently and erroneously printed the price or these articles as $5 each. 
The newspaper sued the storekeeper for the contract price of the advertisement. 
The storekeeper set up a counterclaim that he was obliged by law to sell the 
articles at $5 instead of at $15 and that he thereby incurred a heavy loss. 
Was his counterclaim a valid defense?
Answer:
This is not a valid defense. An advertisement is not an offer but is an invi­
tation to the public to come and purchase. When the customers came in 
response to the advertisement, the storekeeper could have explained readily 
that it was a mistake.
Group II
Answer any five questions in this group. No credit will be given for additional 
answers, and if more are submitted only the first five will be considered.
No. 6 (10 points):
A promissory note, otherwise negotiable, contained a promise to pay the 
sum of $50,000 “in successive semi-annual payments of not less than one 
thousand dollars each, for a period of eight years from date, and the balance 
then due to be payable on demand thereafter, with interest on the principal 
unpaid at the rate of six per cent. per annum, payable semi-annually, together 
with all taxes assessed upon said sum against said payee or the holder of this 
note.” Explain whether or not the foregoing provision affected the nego­
tiability of the note.
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Answer:
In order to be negotiable, a promissory note must be to pay a sum certain 
in money, and it must be payable on demand or at or before a fixed or deter­
minable future time. The fact that the taxes assessed against the payee or 
holder are to be paid in addition to the $50,000 has been held to render the note 
uncertain as to amount and therefore to destroy its negotiability. The provi­
sions as to the semi-annual payments do not make the note uncertain because 
all they amount to is a promise to pay $1,000 semi-annually for eight years 
and the balance on or before eight years.
No. 7 (10 points):
Defendant was the owner of a half interest in, and was director, vice-presi­
dent and general manager of, a mutual casualty company, a corporation en­
gaged in insuring owners of taxicabs against damages for personal injuries. As 
an inducement to plaintiff to purchase defendant’s interest in said corporation, 
defendant gave plaintiff a written statement of the corporation’s financial 
condition which showed a surplus of $112,201.34. In reliance upon said state­
ment, plaintiff purchased defendant’s interest, and shortly thereafter an ex­
amination by the state insurance department showed a deficit of $47,943.01 as 
of the date of the statement. The difference lay in the reserve for outstanding 
losses. The correct amount of that reserve could be determined only by 
examining some 6,000 pending suits and claims and placing on each a reason­
able estimate of liability. No evidence was offered by defendant to show how 
he had determined the amount of the reserve as shown in his statement. On 
these facts, should defendant’s statement be held fraudulent?
Answer:
Yes, defendant’s statement should be held to be fraudulent. It is true that 
there was no showing of knowledge of the falsity or inaccuracy of the statement. 
However, in view of the defendant’s close association with the company it will 
be presumed that his general knowledge of its affairs was such that his furnish­
ing plaintiff with such a misleading statement was fraudulent in the absence of 
any explanation from him.
No. 8 (10 points):
A document entitled “Articles of agreement ’’, duly executed, stated that the 
parties to it agreed to execute a formal lease of certain specified real estate for 
a specified term of years at a specified rental. The document provided for ‘‘ the 
usual and proper covenants” as to possession, surrender and delivery, war­
ranty, re-entry and the like and recited that the lease was to contain “in brief, 
all of the usual and formal clauses to the mutual satisfaction of the parties.” 
Did the phrase “to the mutual satisfaction of the parties” make the document 
indefinite, a mere agreement to agree, and thus unenforceable as a contract?
Answer:
The agreement is enforceable. It contains the important terms of the lease 
to the extent that they are peculiar to that lease, and the other terms can 
readily be proved by usage and custom among real estate men in the commu­
nity. The material parts of the contract thus having been agreed upon, the 
words “to the mutual satisfaction of the parties” do not make this agreement 
any less enforceable. In this case probably all these words meant was that the 
parties expected to agree as to the language.
No. 9 (10 points):
X leased a building from Y to be used as a jewelry store. Just prior to the 
expiration of the lease, Y contracted with Z to wreck the building. Z inspected 
the building prior to making his contract and in the contract he agreed to a 
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legally enforceable penalty for delay beyond a specified date. Upon the ex­
piration of the lease, X vacated, but he abandoned a large safe which he had 
placed in the basement of the building. The lease contained no provision 
applicable to either the installation or the removal of the safe. Z discovered 
the abandonment of the safe after X had vacated and notified X that he would 
hold X responsible for the cost of removing and disposing of the safe (which had 
no sale or scrap value) and also for any penalty for delay necessarily caused by 
the work of removing the safe. Could Z recover from X on either of these 
claims?
Answer:
Z could not recover from X on either of the claims stated. Assuming that 
as between Y and X there was an implied obligation on the part of X to remove 
the safe (as to which there is doubt) such an obligation would not inure to the 
benefit of Z as he had no contractual relationship with X and the contractual 
obligation to remove (if it existed as between Y and X) was not incurred by X 
for the benefit of Z. In so far as Z is concerned there appears to have been no 
negligence on the part of X in leaving the safe in the building.
No. 10 (10 points):
A depositor in the Amalgamated Bank sued the bank to recover the amount 
paid by the bank upon the forged endorsement of the payee of a cheque drawn 
by the depositor. At the time the cheque was given to the payee, the latter 
gave the depositor a promissory note payable on demand for the amount of the 
cheque. The bank pleaded as a defense that the depositor had been negligent 
in not making a timely demand upon the payee of the cheque for the payment 
of the note. Is this a good defense?
Answer:
This is not a good defense. The bank breached its duty to the depositor 
when it paid the cheque on the forged endorsement. The depositor was under 
no obligation to the bank to collect the note and could have canceled the note 
if it saw fit to make a gift of the amount of the cheque to the payee. Negli­
gence of a depositor to be available to the bank as a defense in such a case must 
have been the proximate cause of the payment of the cheque.
No. 11 (10 points):
Plaintiff owned 60% of the capital stock of the Monitor Baking Corporation 
in the city of X. Defendant, who was president and manager of that corpora­
tion, owned 10% of its capital stock. Defendant told plaintiff that he in­
tended to start a baking company of his own in a city over 500 miles away. 
Plaintiff thereupon contracted to buy defendant’s stock in the Monitor Baking 
Corporation, making a cash payment on account and giving a note for the 
balance. Immediately thereafter, defendant organized and became president 
of a new baking corporation in the city of X which was to compete directly 
with the Monitor company. Before maturity of the note and prior to the 
transfer of the stock, plaintiff sued in equity for rescission of the contract. 
Is plaintiff entitled to rescission?
Answer:
This question presents a point on which there is a conflict of authority. 
Probably plaintiff is entitled to a rescission.
Ordinarily a statement of intention as to future action is not a misrepresen­
tation of a fact and does not amount to fraud when the party making the state­
ment subsequently changes his mind. However, some courts hold that a 
false affirmation of a state of mind is fraud.
This appears to be a case for the application of this latter principle. The 
plaintiff apparently made the contract of purchase at the time the defendant 
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stated he intended to start a bakery over 500 miles away. The fair inference 
from defendant’s statement was that he did not intend to start a bakery in the 
city of X. But immediately thereafter he started a bakery in that city. It 
seems apparent that the intention of the defendant at the time of his statement 
to the plaintiff was to start a bakery in the city of X, that such statement was 
false and was made to induce the plaintiff to buy his stock. As a result plain­
tiff doubtless paid much more than the stock was worth. This was a mis­
representation of a material fact.
That a person making such a statement may subsequently in good faith 
change his intention is not an unsurmountable obstacle to establishing fraud. 
The plaintiff may have been willing to take a chance on the defendant’s chang­
ing his intention subsequently in good faith but not have been willing to buy 
had he known defendant’s intention to be at that time to establish a competing 
baking company in the city of X.
No. 12 (10 points):
In August, 1932, the Blake Building Corporation sold a parcel of real estate 
at a profit or excess over cost. The purchaser paid part of the selling price in 
cash and gave a note secured by a purchase-money mortgage for the balance. 
The cash received was less than 40% of the selling price and the corporation 
used the instalment basis in its 1932 federal income-tax return. In January, 
1933, the corporation was dissolved and all its assets including said note were 
distributed to its sole stockholder.
(a) If at the time of dissolution the corporation was indebted to its sole 
stockholder for an amount equal to the amount of said note and the note was 
accepted by the stockholder in discharge of that debt, how should the corpora­
tion account for the balance of the profit on the sale in its 1933 federal income- 
tax return?
(b) Would your answer necessarily be the same as in (a) if said note were 
given to the stockholder as part of the liquidating dividend?
Answer:
(a) The corporation should report as income the difference between (1) the 
excess of the face value of the note over the amount of income which would be 
returnable if the note were satisfied in full and (2) the amount realized upon the 
disposition of the note. Assuming that the property cost $10,000, was sold 
for $20,000 of which $5,000 was received in cash and $15,000 by way of note, 
the difference between (2) $15,000 which is the amount of the debt satisfied and 
therefore the amount received for the note and (1) $7,500, is the amount the 
corporation should report as income in its 1933 return.
(b) If the note were given to the stockholder as part of a liquidating divi­
dend, the fair market value of the note at date of distribution would be con­
sidered the amount realized by the corporation instead of the amount of in­
debtedness to the stockholder which was satisfied by the note as in case (a). 
If the fair market value of the note at date of disposition is greater or less than 
its face value, the income returnable under (b) will be different from the 
income returnable under (a).
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